书讯 | 陈杨：《社会意识的起源与转型：一种建构社会自然主义的尝试》出版
书 名
Chen, Yang, The Genesis and Transformation of Social Consciousness: An Attempt at the Construction of Social Naturalism. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan Imprint by Springer Nature AG, 2024.
《社会意识的起源与转型：一种建构社会自然主义的尝试》，卡姆（瑞士）：施普林格自然出版社帕尔格雷夫麦克米伦出版商，2024年版
作者简介
陈杨，武汉大学哲学学士，柏林洪堡大学文学硕士（M.A），法兰克福大学哲学博士（Dr.Phil）。现为中山大学马克思主义哲学与中国现代化研究所暨抢庄牛牛 助理教授。主要研究领域为社会哲学，法兰克福学派和批判理论。
摘 要
This book focuses on the formation of human social consciousness and develops a naturalist approach to social normativity. Beginning from Marx's uncompleted concept of social consciousness, the book retrospects the studies about collective intentionality in the area of philosophy of mind and social ontology. Specifically, a reinterpretation of social consciousness with respect to collective intentionality can offer us a new, naturalistic approach to the social formation and normativity. According to the naturalistic approach, we can discern the inner structure of social consciousness as a systematic pattern of Intentionality. Social consciousness involves three levels of development: subjective, objective and absolute. With this new pattern of social consciousness, the “naturalism” of the young Karl Marx can be revived. And by grasping the most essential ability of human Intentionality as the source of social formation, it also makes an interdisciplinary study of social philosophy and philosophy of mind possible.
本书关注人类社会意识的形态，并发展了一种关于社会规范性的自然主义进路。本书从马克思尚未完成的“社会意识”概念出发，并回顾了心灵哲学和社会本体论领域关于集体意向性的研究。具体而言，本书认为，从集体意向性的角度出发对社会意识的重新解释可以为我们提供一种关于社会形态和规范性的新的、自然主义的进路。根据这种自然主义进路，我们可以将社会意识的内在结构视为一种意向性的系统模式。社会意识包括三个发展层次：主观、客观和绝对。有了这一新的社会意识的模式，青年马克思的 “自然主义”就可以复兴。而通过将人类意向性这一最本质的能力把握为社会形态的源泉，也使得社会哲学和心灵哲学的跨学科研究成为可能。
目 录
1 Introduction
1.1 The Ontological Refection of Political and Social Beliefs
1.2 The Rediscovery of Social Consciousness
1.3 The Collective Intentionality Hypothesis
1.4 Between Idealism and Materialism: A Naturalist Approach
1.5 Summary of Chapters
Bibliography
Part I Intentionality and Actions
2 From Speech Act to Intentionality
2.1 Prehistory: The Performative Theory of Speech Acts
2.2 John Searle and Psychological Reduction
2.3 Meaning or Intentionality? Critique of Psychological Reduction
Bibliography
3 The Structure of Intentionality
3.1 The Intentionality in Perceptions
3.2 The Intentionality in Actions
3.3 Intentionality and Causality
3.4 The Problem of the Background
Bibliography
4 The Meaningful Action and Commitment
4.1 The Skeptical Argument and the Failure of Volition Theories
4.2 Meaningful Action,Commitment, and Intentionality
4.3 Conclusion: The Limits of Intentionality as Subjective
Bibliography
Part Il Collective Intentionality andNormativity
5 Normativity as Rational Grounds
5.1 Norm Individualism: Instrumental Reason to Act
5.2 L00Norm Rationalism: Self-Constitution of Normative Agency
5.3 Deficits of Rational Approaches
Bibliography
6 Normativity as Collective Creation
6.1 Joint Commitment and Endowment with an “Ought”
6.2 Social Reality and Institutional Facts
6.3 Elements of Creating Institutional Facts
6.4 Collective Imposition and Recognition
6.5 Power Relations in the Background
Bibliography
7 Normativity as Intersubjective Control
7.1 Interdependence:Humans as Ultrasocial Species
7.2 Limits of Intersubjective Control
7.3 Conclusion: The Limits ofIntentionality as Objective
Bibliography
Part Ill Normativity with Universal Validity
8 Communication and Social Evolution
8.1 Ideology and Political Domination
8.2 Communicative Action and Emancipatory Interest
8.3 Communicative Action and Social Evolution
8.4 Tbe Mutual Exclusion of Communicative and Strategic Action
Bibliography
9 Discourse Ethics and Moral Cognitivism
9.1 A Practical Discourse of Normative ]ustification
9.2 Political Realism on the Legitimation Problem
9.3 Idealization, Institutionalization, and the Lifeworld
Bibliography
10 Critique of Cognitive Parallelism
10.1 Criticism I:Non-neutrality of the Normative Criterion
10.2 Legitimation as Storytelling Process
10.3 Criticism Il: Paradigm and Research Program
10.4 An Alternative Parallelism:Social Consciousness and Paradigm
10.5 Social Naturalism:Social Consciousness as Intentionality Pattern
Bibliography
11 Conclusion
Bibliography
Bibliography
Index
1. 导言
1.1 政治与社会信念的本体论反思
1.2 社会意识的再发现
1.3 集体意向性假说
1.4 在唯心主义与唯物主义之间：一种自然主义进路
1.5 章节综述
第一部分：意向性与行动
2. 从言语行为到意向性
2.1 前史：言语行为的行为理论
2.2 约翰.塞尔与心理学还原
2.3 意义或是意向性？心理学还原的批判
3. 意向性的结构
3.1 感觉中的意向性
3.2 行动中的意向性
3.3 意向性与因果性
3.4 “背景”的问题
4. 有意义的行动与承诺
4.1 怀疑论论证与意志理论的失败
4.2 有意义的行动、承诺与意向性
4.3 结论：作为主观意向性的局限
第二部分：集体意向性与规范性
5. 规范性作为理性的缘由
5.1 规范的个人主义：行为的工具理性
5.2 规范的理性主义：规范行动者的自我建构
5.3 理性进路的缺陷
6. 规范性作为集体的创造
6.1 共同承诺与“应当”的给予
6.2 社会实体与制度事实
6.3 创造制度事实的要素
6.4 集体实施与承认
6.5 “背景”中的权力关系
7. 规范性作为主体间的控制
7.1 相互依赖：人类作为极度社会性的物种
7.2 主体间的控制的局限
7.3 结论：作为客观意向性的局限
第三部分：具有普遍有效性的规范性
8. 交往与社会演化
8.1 意识形态与政治统治
8.2 交往行为与解放的旨趣
8.3 交往行为与社会演化
8.4 交往与策略行为的互斥
9. 商谈伦理与道德认知主义
9.1 规范性证成的商谈实践
9.2合法性问题的政治实在论
9.3 理想化、制度化与生活世界
10 认知相似性的批判
10.1 批判1：规范性标准的非中立性
10.2 合法性作为讲故事的过程
10.3 批判2：范式与研究纲领
10.4 一种替代的相似性：社会意识与范式
10.5 社会自然主义：社会意识作为意向性模式
11. 结论
